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A NECESSITY OR SURPLUSAGE?
The rights of the Nigerian child are set out in the Child’s Rights Act, 2003. The Act made specific 
provisions for the rights of the disabled child. This paper critically examines the relevance of these 
provisions in the light of other legislations in Nigeria. It finds that the provisions are a surplusage and 
counter-productive; they should therefore, be deleted.
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Закон о правах детей в Нигерии и права ребенка-инвалида: необходимость или 
излишество?
Права ребенка закреплены в Законе Нигерии о правах детей 2003 года. В Законе содержатся 
конкретные положения о правах ребенка-инвалида. Автор статьи подвергает критике актуаль-
ность этих положений в свете других законов Нигерии. Аргументируется, почему эти положения 
являются излишними и контрпродуктивными, и их следует исключить.
Ключевые слова: права детей; инвалидность; Нигерия; международные инструменты.
Introduction. The rights of the Nigerian child were provided for in different 
enactments in Nigeria that were not entirely made for children. These set of enact-
ments include the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;1 the Criminal 
1 Section 17(3)(f) provides for the obligation of Nigeria to direct its policy towards ensuring that 
children and young persons are protected against any exploitation, whatsoever, and against moral 
and material neglect.
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Code Act;1 the Penal Code Law;2 the Matrimonial Causes Act;3 the Labour Act;4 
and so on. The first enactment that authoritatively recognized a child in Nigeria in 
terms of welfare and was entirely made for the Nigerian child, was the Children and 
Young Persons Ordinance 19435. 
After the existence of the Ordinance in 1943, came the need for a more recent 
single enactment. The need was actualized when the Child’s Rights Act was enacted 
in 2003. 
The Child’s Right Act of Nigeria6 was enacted on the 31st day of July, 2003 and 
was hilariously welcomed, as it was an answer to the clarion call for a comprehensive 
and recent enactment on the rights of the Nigerian child.7
The Act, made up of 278 sections of 24 parts with 11 schedules made provisions 
for several rights of the Nigerian child, for reason of which it has been described as 
“a milestone”8 and “a very ambitious legislation”. 9
The Act made specific provisions for the disabled child and attests to the Act as 
not only a milestone but a very ambitious legislation on the rights of the Nigerian 
child.
1 Cap C38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010 which respectively provides in sections 30 and 39 
that a male child under the age of 12 cannot be convicted of the offence of unlawful carnal knowledge; 
and that a juvenile who has been convicted of the offence of treason by way of instigating invasion 
of Nigeria, a crime that is punishable by death, shall not so be punished, but shall be detained at the 
pleasure of the President.
2 Law No. 89 Northern Laws of Nigeria, 1963 which provides in section 50(a) that a child under the 
age of 7 cannot be convicted of an offence.
3 Cap M7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010 which respectively provides in sections 70, 71 and 
72 for the right of the child to maintenance; to welfare, advancement or education; and to settlement 
of property.
4 Cap L1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010 which respectively provides in sections 49(3); 51; 
59(3); 60(2) and 61 for the right a young person above the age of twelve years and below the age of 
sixteen years to enter into a contract of apprenticeship; for the right of a child above twelve years 
who is an apprentice to be entitled to wages if retained after the agreed period of apprenticeship; for 
the right of a young person under the age of fourteen years to be employed on a daily wage, and on a 
day-to-day basis; for the right of a young person over the age of sixteen years to be employed during 
the night in some industrial undertakings or activities; and for the right of any person even under 
the age of fifteen years to be employed in vessels.
5 The Children and Young Persons Ordinance, 1943 later became Chapter 31 of the Laws of Nigeria 
as revised in 1948 and was later retained as Chapter 32 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
and Lagos as revised in 1958. The Ordinance (now termed Act) was made applicable to Lagos in 
1946, was extended to the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria by Ordinance-in-Council No. 22 
of 1946 and was enacted for Northern Nigeria in 1958. On the adoption of state structure in 1967, 
many states enacted their own Children and Young Persons Laws which are identical to the original 
legislation. Having become state law the enactment was omitted in the Revised Editions of the Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, 2004 and 2010.
6 Child’s Rights Act, Cap C50, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010, hereinafter simply referred to 
as “the Act”.
7 B.O. Igwenyi “A Comment on the Child Rights Act”, Ebonyi State University Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 
1 October 2005, pp. 159–169.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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Commendable though it is, that the Act made specific provisions for the disabled 
child, the aim of this paper is to examine whether the specific provisions were nec-
essary or a mere surplusage and further examine the effect of the specific provisions 
(if any), on the rights of the disabled child. This paper shall do so under the theoret-
ical framework of the Specific Provisions of the Act, vis-а-vis Similar Provisions in 
Some International Instruments; the Need or otherwise for the Specific Provisions; 
Conclusion and Recommendation.
The Specific Provisions in the Act vis-а-vis Similar Provisions in Some Inter-
national Instruments. The specific provisions in the Act have their equivalent in 
some international instruments, specifically, the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, 1990. Nigeria signed and ratified the Convention1 and signed the Charter2 
long before the coming into existence of the Act,3 but the provisions of the interna-
tional instruments do not apply in Nigeria because the instruments were not part of 
the domestic laws of Nigeria as provided for, under section 12 of the Constitution 
of Nigeria.4
The Act that was a ready substitute for the non-applicable Convention and the 
Charter, made provisions for the rights of disabled children, as the Convention and 
the Charter did.
A comparative analysis of the specific provisions in the Act, the Convention and 
the Charter shall now be made:
The Convention made specific provisions for the rights of disabled children in 
these words:
States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy 
a full and decent life in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance, and 
facilitate the child’s active participation in the community.5 
However, according to the Convention, a disabled child shall enjoy the rights 
provided in the immediate preceding paragraph, “subject to available resources” or 
“whenever possible”. From the Convention, 
States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care and shall 
encourage and ensure the extension, subject to available resources, to the eligible 
child and those responsible for his or her care, of assistance for which application is 
1 The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 20th day of November, 
1989 and came into force on the 2nd day of September, 1990. It was respectively signed and ratified 
by Nigeria on the 29th day of January, 1990 and the 23rd day of July, 2001.
2 The Charter was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (African Union, with effect from the 
9th day of July, 2002) on the 1st day, July 1990 and came into force on the 29th day of November, 1999. 
It was signed by Nigeria on the 13th day of July, 2001.
3 The Act came into existence on the 31st day, July, 2003.
4 By the provision of section 12 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, any 
international instrument that has not been enacted as an Act of the National Assembly shall not 
apply in Nigeria. The Convention and the Charter were not so enacted.
5 The Convention, Article XXIII (1).
Ajanwachuku M. A. The Nigerian child’s rights act and rights of the disabled child: a necessity or surplusage? 
225ISSN 2414-990X. Problems of legality. 2017. Issue 138
made and which is appropriate to the child’s condition and to the circumstances of 
the parents or others caring for the child.1  
And that
Recognizing the special need of a disabled child, assistance extended … shall be 
provided free of charge, whenever possible….2
The Charter has a similar provision for the rights of disabled children and also 
has two subsequent provisions that restricted the enjoyment of the rights. The 
restriction is “subject to available resources”, as provided for in the Convention 
but did not include “whenever possible” as provided for in the Convention. The 
provisions in the Charter are as follows:
Every child who is mentally or physically disabled shall have the right to special 
measures of protection in keeping with his physical and moral needs and under 
conditions which ensure his dignity, promote his self-reliance and active participation 
in the community.3
For the restrictions, 
States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, subject to available resources, 
to a disabled child and to those responsible for his care, of assistance for which 
application is made and which is appropriate to the child’s condition and in particular 
shall ensure that the disabled child has effective access to training, preparation for 
employment and recreational activities in a manner conducive to the child achieving 
the possible social integration, individual development and his cultural and moral 
development.4
And that
The States Parties to the present Charter shall use their available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full convenience of the mentally and physically 
disabled person to movement and access to public highway, buildings and other 
places to which the disabled may legitimately want to have access to.5
Just as the Convention and the Charter made specific provisions for the rights 
of a disabled child, the Act has such provisions. According to the Act, every child 
who is in need of special protection measures has the right to such measures of 
protection as is appropriate to his physical, social, economic, emotional and mental 
needs and under conditions which ensure his dignity, promote his self-reliance and 
active participation in the community.6
The Act made use of the expression “special protection measures” unlike the 
Convention and the Charter that employed the expression “mentally or physically 
disabled”. However, the content of the provisions in the Act, particularly when 
compared with the similar provisions under the Convention and the Charter shows 
1 Ibid., Article XXIII (2). Underlining mine, for emphasis.
2 Ibid., Article XXIII (3). Underlining mine, for emphasis.
3 The Charter, Article XIII (1).
4 Ibid., Article XIII (2). Underlining mine, for emphasis.
5 Ibid., Article XIII (3). Underlining mine, for emphasis.
6 The Act, section 16 (1).
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that the expression “special protection” means no less than “mentally or physically 
disabled”. The Charter in the chapter heading of Article XIII even employed yet 
another equivalent expression, “handicapped children”.
As in under the Convention and the Charter, the Act has a provision that 
restricted the enjoyment of rights by disabled children. However, while as already 
seen in this work, the restrictions are found in two different provisions under the 
Convention and the Charter; under the Act, the restriction is found in one provision. 
The single provision states that every person, authority, body or institution that 
has the care or the responsibility for ensuring the care of a child in need of special 
protection measures shall endeavour, within the available resources, to provide 
the child with such assistance and facilities which are necessary for his education, 
training, preparation for employment, rehabilitation, and recreational opportunities 
in a manner conducive to his achieving the fullest possible social integration and 
individual development and his cultural and moral development.1
The Act restricted the rights of the disabled child to “available resources” just 
like the two provisions in the Convention that restricted the rights to “available 
resources” and “whenever possible”; and the two provisions in the Charter that 
restricted the rights to “available resources”.
Having made a succinct comparison of specific provisions in the rights of the 
disabled child as set out in the Convention, the Charter, and the Act, this paper shall 
now dwell on its theme, whether the specific provisions in the Act is a necessity or 
a surplusage; and what the effect of the specific provisions (if any), is, on the rights 
provided for the disabled child.
The Need or Otherwise for the Specific Provisions. The express provision for 
the rights of the disabled child was a manifest show that the framers did not want 
to take for granted that, the interests of those who are disabled have been accom-
modated in the Act. The only regrettable circumstance (as can be gleaned from this 
work) is that the effect of these specific provisions were gravely watered down by 
the “subject to available resources” clause.
Notwithstanding the unfortunate circumstance, the relevance of this paper is 
to determine whether it was even necessary for the specific provisions to have been 
made; and to further determine the effects of the specific provisions (if any), on the 
rights provided for the disabled child. This paper shall analyse the various provisions 
of the Act and thereafter venture an answer to the issues for determination.
The relevance of the provisions of the Act for the disabled child is to ensure that 
the disabled child’s survival and development are guaranteed. It is for this reason 
that the Act pungently made a provision that a child who is in need of special pro-
tection measures has the right to such special protection measures as is appropriate 
to the child’s physical, social, economic, emotional and mental needs.2 The Act 
further made a provision that such rights shall be made available to the child under 
conditions that ensure the dignity of the child, that promotes his self-reliance and 
1 Ibid., section 16 (2). Underlining mine, for emphasis.
2 Note 21, loc.cit.
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also promotes his active participation in the affairs of the community.1 These rights 
to survival and development of the disabled child have adequately been captured 
in section 4 of the Act that provides that “every child has a right to survival and 
development” the phrase “every child” as used in this section is not exclusive of the 
disabled.
The provisions in the Act at all times employed the word “child” or “children” 
and in circumstances that show that there exist no intentions of excluding, or that 
there was an exclusion of the disabled child. The Act was made for the child, not 
for the non-disabled child. “Child” within the contemplation of the Act includes the 
disabled child. It never contemplates excluding them. If, as it were, the word “child” 
includes the disabled, there was no need to make specific provisions for the disabled 
child when the provisions of the Act without those specific provisions covered the 
interest of the child, whether disabled or not.
Where a child is disabled, he is not at all disadvantaged by the absence of any 
specific provisions for him because by the fact of being a child all actions taken by 
any group, must have his best interest as the paramount consideration. The adequate 
protection that enures to the child, including the disabled child, is sufficiently 
captured in the first section of the Act in these words:
In any action concerning a child, whether undertaken by an individual, public 
or private body, institutions or service, a court of law, or administrative or legislative 
authority, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration.
By virtue of this provision of the Act, the disabled child is entitled to anything 
that it shall be in his best interest to have. For this reason therefore, there is no need 
for specific provisions for the rights of a disabled child.
From what has been discovered in this work, the effect of the specific provisions 
was watered down by the “subject to available resources” clause. By that clause, 
where resources are not available or are available but not adequate, the disabled child 
cannot enjoy the specific rights provided for in the Act. Whether or not resources are 
available or are adequate may become a subject matter of litigation that would last 
for several years as characterizes litigation in Nigeria. With all these impediments 
to the realization of the specific rights, one may contend that the specific rights 
defeated themselves.
What is more, the Convention and the Charter provided for some rights that 
were not provided for, in the Act. The respective rights are the rights of the disabled, 
to the benefits of international co-operation; and the rights of the disabled, to equal 
access to education with all sections of the community. The Convention has this to 
say:
States Parties shall promote in the spirit of international co-operation the 
exchange of appropriate information in the field of preventive healthcare and of 
medical, psychological and functional treatment of disabled children, including 
dissemination of access to information concerning methods of rehabilitation 
education and vocational services, with the aim of enabling States Parties to improve 
1 Ibid.
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their capabilities and skills and to widen their experience in these areas. In this 
regard, particular account shall be taken to [sic] the needs of developing countries.1
The rights set out in the Charter are in these words: 
Every child shall have the right to education. States Parties to the present 
Charter shall take all appropriate measures with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right and shall in particular…take special measures in respect of 
…disadvantaged children, to ensure equal access to education for all section of the 
community.2
These important rights set out in the Convention and the Charter were not 
provided for in the Act, which Act has made specific provisions for the rights of the 
disabled to measures of protection appropriate to their needs,3 although subject to 
available resources.4
By the express provision for the right to measures of protection and the exclu-
sion of the rights to benefits of international co-operation; and to education, respec-
tively provided for in the Convention and in the Charter, the ready inference is that 
the Act never wanted the type of rights provided for in the Convention and in the 
Charter to be available to the disabled Nigerian child. The maxim has always been 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is to say, the express mention of a thing is 
an implied exclusion of another.5 In other words, the express mention in the Act, of 
the right to measures of protection is an implied exclusion of the rights, not found 
in the Act, for examples, the right to benefits of international co-operation and the 
right to education as respectively provided for in the Convention and in the Char-
ter. Having provided for the rights to measures of protection, if the Act had wanted 
to provide for the right to the benefits of international co-operation and the right 
to education, it would have provided for them, as it did for the right to measures 
of protection. With the effect of the specific provisions excluding the rights not 
specifically provided for; and limiting the rights to those provided for, the specific 
provisions counter the intent and purport of the Act: “The best interest of the child… 
[being of]… primary consideration”. It is obviously not in the best interest of the 
child, that some rights that should be available to them (e.g. right to the benefits 
of international co-operation; and rights to education as respectively provided for 
under the Convention and under the Charter) are not available to them. 
With the exclusion of other rights by specific rights, one may contend that the 
specific rights are counter-productive.
1 Note 15, op.cit., Article XXIII (4).
2 Note 18, op.cit., Article XI (1); (2); (3) (e).
3 Note 21, loc.cit. 
4 Note 22, loc.cit.
5 The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Sun Insurance (Nig) Plc v.UECC Ltd (2015) 11 NWLR (pt. 1471) 
p. 2 ratio 7. The alternative expressions are inclusio unius exclusio alterius (the inclusion of a thing 
is an implied exclusion of another) or enumeratio unius exclusio alterius (the enumeration of a thing 
is an exclusion of another). For these expressions (i.e. expressio unius est exclusio alterius, inclusio 
unius exclusio alterius and enumeratio unius exclusio alterius) see the Court of Appeal of Nigeria in 
Oloja v. Governor, Benue State (2016) 3 NWLR (pt. 1499) 217 ratio 5.
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Conclusion and Recommendation. So far what has been discovered is that 
the specific provisions for the disabled Nigerian child have been accommodated by 
the provisions of the Act which neither struck a distinction between the disabled 
and the non-disabled nor could by any stretch of imagination be interpreted as not 
protective of the disabled child. It has further been discovered that whatever right 
a disabled child contemplates has already been afforded by section 1 of the Act that 
guarantees that the paramount consideration in all things, is the best interest of 
the child, which undoubtedly never excluded the disabled. Again, it has also been 
discovered that the limiting clause in the specific provisions constitute device that 
can make the realization of the rights in the specific provisions slim.
From all these, the obvious conclusion is that the specific provisions in the Act 
on the rights of the disabled children are not necessary. Having been covered by the 
numerous provisions in the Act and the omnibus provision in section 1 of the Act, 
at best, the specific provisions constitute a surplusage; which surplusage it has been 
opined (in this paper), is counter-productive.
On account of the discovery that the surplusage is counter-productive, the 
recommendation is that the specific provisions comprised therein be expunged from 
the Act.
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Закон про права дітей в Нігерії та права дитини з обмеженими можливостями: необхід-
ність чи надмірність?
Права дитини закріплені в Законі Нігерії про права дітей 2003 року. Цей Закон містить 
конкретні положення щодо прав дитини з обмеженими можливостями. Автор статті піддає кри-
тиці актуальність цих положень в світлі інших законодавчих актів Нігерії. Аргументовано, що ці 
положення є надлишковими і непродуктивними, тому вони мають бути вилучені.
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